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Abstract
Since fall 2012, several National Centers of Aca-
demic Excellence in Cyber Defense Research
(CAE-Rs) fielded a collaborative course to en-
gage students in solving applied cybersecurity
research problems. We describe our experiences
with this Information Security Research and Ed-
ucation (INSuRE) research collaborative. We
explain how we conducted our project-based re-
search course, give examples of student projects,
and discuss the outcomes and lessons learned.
Index terms— INSuRE Project, cybersecu-
rity education, National Centers of Academic
Excellence in Cyber Defense Research (CAE-
Rs), project-based learning.
1 The INSuRE Project
The Information Security Research and Edu-
cation (INSuRE) research collaborative2 is a
1University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC),
University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH), University of
Texas at Dallas (UTD), University of Houston (Houston),
Stevens Institute of Technology (Stevens)
2http://insurehub.org/about-us
network of National Centers of Academic Ex-
cellence in Cyber Defense Research (CAE-Rs)
universities that cooperate to engage students
in solving applied cybersecurity research prob-
lems. Since fall 2012, INSuRE has fielded a
multi-institutional cybersecurity research course
in which BS, MS, and PhD students work in
small groups to solve unclassified problems pro-
posed by the National Security Agency (NSA)
and by other government and private organiza-
tions and laboratories.
In this paper we describe our experiences with
the INSuRE Project. We explain how we con-
ducted our project-based research course, give
examples of student projects, and discuss the
outcomes, benefits, and lessons learned.
The approximately eighty CAE-R universi-
ties3 include a significant collection of cyber-
security students, educators, and researchers.
While the individual universities were “nodes of
excellence,” these nodes were not purposefully
constellated into a research network. The IN-
SuRE Project created an educational and re-
search network of CAE-Rs. As such, INSuRE
is a self-organizing, multi-disciplinary, multi-
3https://www.iad.gov/NIETP/reports/cae_designated_institutions.cfm
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institutional, and multi-level collaborative orga-
nization.
The central activity of the INSuRE Project is
its cybersecurity research course, in which stu-
dents form small groups that work on research
problems of interest to the nation. The NSA
and other organizations support the project by
contributing suggested problems and by provid-
ing technical directors to mentor student groups.
The geographically-diverse participants connect
and collaborate using a variety of conferencing
and data-sharing technologies.
Students benefit from an exciting opportunity
to work collaboratively on real-world problems
and to interact with experienced technical di-
rectors. They learn how to carry out research,
including producing fast, incremental, and ac-
tionable results in team projects. Benefits to
participating government organizations include
collaborative work on important problems and
access to university faculty and to highly moti-
vated and capable students for possible employ-
ment. In addition, faculty benefit from building
connections with other researchers, schools, and
government organizations.
Melissa Dark (Purdue), and Mark Loep-
ker, NSA Security Education Academic Liaison
(SEAL) for Purdue, started the INSuRE Project
in 2012. Dark provided the students and Loep-
ker provided the NSA research problems, along
with NSA Technical Directors under Trent Pit-
senbarger’s leadership. For more information
about INSuRE, see Dark, et al. [5, 7, 8].
2 The INSuRE Course
The first INSuRE course took place in fall 2012
at Purdue, involving five students who formed
two groups supported by three technical direc-
Table 1: Growth of the INSuRE cybersecurity
research course from fall 2012 through spring
2017: number of universities, students, technical
directors (TDs: NSA + other government orga-
nizations), and student groups. For example, in
fall 2016, there were eleven TDs, including five
from NSA and six others.
Term Univs. Stud- TDs Groups
ents
2012 fall 1 5 3+0 1
2013 summer 1 1 0 1
2014 spring 3 33 7+0 13
2014 summer 1 1 0 1
2014 fall 4 22 7+1 8
2015 spring 8 52 7+3 21
2015 fall 7 42 8+8 14
2016 spring 6 72 6+9 27
2016 fall 8 64 5+6 25
2017 spring 7 54 6+15 22
tors (TDs). With funding from the National Sci-
ence Foundation, the project added three more
schools: University of California, Davis; Missis-
sippi State; and University of Maryland, Bal-
timore County (UMBC). Many of the INSuRE
students are CyberCorps®: Scholarship for Ser-
vice (SFS)4 scholars.
In the following years, the course expanded
to include a total of twelve universities, six na-
tional labs, and two state organizations.5 In
4https://www.sfs.opm.gov/
5The additional universities included Carnegie Mellon
University, Dakota State University, Iowa State Univer-
sity, Northeastern University, Stevens Institute of Tech-
nology, University of Alabama in Huntsville, University
of Houston, University of Texas at Dallas, and University
of Texas at San Antonio. The additional organizations
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some years, a small number of private compa-
nies participated. For example, the spring 2014
edition included a private defense contractor, As-
sured Information Security, located in UMBC’s
research park. Each partner organization sug-
gested research problems. Table 1 summarizes
the growth of the INSuRE course.
Every semester, a rotating subset of the collab-
orating universities offers a section of the course
at their schools. Doing so enables each univer-
sity to participate at a frequency that suits its
needs, while fostering a diverse set of relation-
ships among the schools.
To facilitate collaboration, the project used
PURR, an instantiation at Purdue of the open
source software platform HUBzero®.6 Users
can share files, publish datasets and compu-
tational tools with Digital Object Identifiers,
and participate asynchronously in discussion
groups across multiple institutions. Individuals
and groups participated synchronously in peri-
odic community meetings using the WebEx con-
ferencing software, supplemented by an audio
bridge. INSuRE instructors shared experiences
and developed common syllabi, handouts, and
grading rubrics.
All class activities revolved around student
projects. TDs presented their suggested prob-
lems. Students submitted bids and formed
groups (typically three to five students each).
In some schools, instructors assigned groups; in
other schools, students self-selected the groups.
included Argonne National Laboratories, Indiana Office
of Technology, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, New
Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness,
Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Pacific Northwest Na-
tional Laboratories, and Sandia National Laboratories.
6https://hubzero.org/
Each group prepared a proposal, including a lit-
erature review, specific aims, and research plan.
Formal group presentations to the INSuRE com-
munity included progress reports and final re-
ports.
Throughout the course, students interacted
with their TD. TDs could check on the status
of their groups, including reading a “dashboard”
slide summarizing the group’s progress.
Most groups worked on problems suggested
by the TDs; some proposed their own “custom”
projects or variations of suggested problems. Or-
ganizations sometimes proposed the same or a
similar project in multiple semesters. Student
groups were allowed to continue projects com-
pleted in previous terms, or in some cases, revisit
a problem addressed by others before.
Once a semester, key faculty and student
members from each of the participating schools
met in person, together with some of the TDs, to
review outcomes, discuss possible improvements,
nurture relationships, and plan ahead.
In summer 2016, the project initiated
INSuRE-Con,7 an annual student-organized re-
search conference featuring five competitively-
selected project presentations from the INSuRE
class.
3 Project Examples
To illustrate the type of research carried out in
the INSuRE course, we comment briefly on the
suggested problem lists and describe several rep-
resentative projects, including three in some de-
tail.
Problem Lists. Partner organizations pro-
vided lists of suggested problems covering a wide
7https://sites.google.com/a/uah.edu/insurecon16/proceedings
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range of topics, including, for example, policy-
based stored information management, protec-
tion, and access control; software assurance, in-
cluding machine-assisted semantic understand-
ing of code; cloud computing, including cleaning
up data spillage in Hadoop clouds; forensics, in-
cluding cloud forensics and mobility forensics in
the Internet of Things; deriving intelligence from
an encrypted VPN stream; protocol analysis and
verification; attacking botnets; machine learning
for malware classification; vehicular data bus se-
curity; and incident response capabilities assess-
ment.
TD Pitsenbarger explained, “The tasks we
place on our INSuRE task list represent areas
where the organization needs greater insight and
past tasks have helped us.” These areas include
understanding new technologies (e.g., FIDO au-
thentication), tool development (e.g., control
flow integrity), and validation of guidance (e.g.,
guidance on cleaning up spillages of sensitive
data in clouds).
Example 1: Moving Target Defense.
A three-student team from UT Dallas, work-
ing together with Argonne National Laborato-
ries, developed a Moving Target Defense (MTD)
to protect against probing attacks on web
servers [14]. At random bounded intervals be-
tween 15 and 60 seconds, the system switched
the web server between Apache and Nginx. Dy-
namically updated IP tables redirected web traf-
fic to the active server. This deception aimed to
hinder attacks by constantly changing the tar-
get.
To test the effectiveness of their system, the
team launched simulated attacks against the
web service, with and without MTD protection.
With MTD protection, a Word Press application
ran normally 76% of the time, experienced lag
14% of the time, and was down 10% of the time.
By contrast, without MTD the application ran
normally 13% of the time, experienced lag 7% of
the time, and was down 80% of the time.
This work suggests that MTD can be a prac-
tical and effective defense against web service
probing attacks.
Example 2: Analysis of FIDO.
In three separate terms, teams from UMBC,
Purdue, and Stevens Institute of Technology
analyzed the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) au-
thentication protocol under development by the
FIDO Alliance. In spring 2014, a team from
UMBC studied the new FIDO protocol, assess-
ing its goals, strengths, and weaknesses. This
team complemented the work of another concur-
rent UMBC team that studied the PICO authen-
tication system. FIDO and PICO offer different
approaches toward the eventual replacement of
passwords.
Building on the initial UMBC work, in fall
2014, a team from Purdue evaluated the vulnera-
bility of the FIDO Ready (TM) Samsung Galaxy
S5 fingerprint reader to a particular spoofing at-
tack [4]. Discovered by a German security re-
search lab, this attack lifted a latent fingerprint.
The Purdue team was unable to replicate this at-
tack successfully, though they were able to pro-
duce a fingerprint by lifting a latent fingerprint.
Building on the Purdue work, in spring 2015,
a team from Stevens studied two attacks on each
of four different fingerprint scanners: two FIDO
compliant devices (Samsung Galaxy S5, iPhone
S5) and two non-FIDO compliant devices (Ham-
ster Area Scanner, Validity Swipe Sensor). For
each of these two device categories, one device
had a swipe sensor and one device had an area
sensor. One attack created a “fake finger;” the
other produced a latent fingerprint. The team
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was able to carry out each attack successfully on
the S5 and on both non-FIDO compliant devices.
Differences between FIDO and non-FIDO com-
pliant devices were not due to the FIDO protocol
but rather to differences in the strengths of the
component authenticators.
Subsequently, NSA removed the problem from
the INSuRE problem set because the three stu-
dent teams had answered all of the questions.
Example 3: Detecting Intrusions on SCADA
Systems.
A two-student team from Mississippi State
University studied machine learning techniques
for detecting cyber attacks against industrial
control systems [15]. The team worked from a
dataset by Pan [11] of cyber attacks and normal
behavior from an electricity transmission system.
The dataset included alteration and injection at-
tacks against protection relays and Energy Man-
agement System (EMS) software. The injection
attacks sent illicit network packets to protection
relays to cause the relays to operate and open
a circuit breaker. The alteration attacks used
a Man-in-the-Middle to alter voltage and cur-
rent sensor data sent from phasor measurement
units to the EMS software. The dataset also in-
cluded instances of single line-to-ground faults at
random locations in the simulated transmission
system, and changes in system load at random
times.
First, the team extracted features from the
dataset and applied clustering techniques to
learn classes of events. Second, the team built a
classifier using the Mamdani fuzzy inference sys-
tem. Inputs to the classifier comprised a hetero-
geneous collection of voltage, current, frequency,
Snort log, and protection relay log information
from one time stamp.
The team validated their work by compar-
ing results to similar classifiers developed from
K-means and Fuzzy C-Means clustering algo-
rithms. Their approach outperformed K-means-
and Fuzzy C-means-based intrusion detection
systems.
Additional Examples. In spring 2014, the IN-
SuRE Project negotiated access to Google Glass
by some INSuRE students who analyzed its secu-
rity. A UMBC student team discovered a vulner-
ability and developed a proof-of-concept demon-
stration exploit, enabling an adversary to acti-
vate the eyewear and capture images without the
subject’s knowledge.
Also in spring 2014, a UMBC PhD student led
a group working on a custom project to perform
a security audit of software developed for the
Random-Sample Election Project.8
A Purdue team investigated information leak-
age from encrypted output from a Cisco ASA
5506 Virtual Private Network (VPN) appli-
ance. The team discovered a vulnerability in
the VPN’s use of Quick UDP Internet Connec-
tions (QUIC), an experimental transport layer
protocol designed in 2012 at Google. QUIC
exposed the length of short communications,
such as passwords, even when encrypted, as a
result of aligning cryptographic block bound-
aries to contain packet loss. When Purdue re-
ported the vulnerability, Google responded that
the vulnerability is broader than QUIC and
also impacts Transport Layer Security (TLS). If
Googles claim is true, the vulnerability could be
used to undermine authentication in TLS (for
short passwords) and impacts over 96% of all
websites. Google and Apple are working with
Purdue to create a patch to protect QUIC, TLS,
and other transport security protocols vulnera-
ble to leaking encrypted password lengths.
8http://rsvoting.org/
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Working on the problem of commercial so-
lutions for classified, another Purdue team ex-
plored the impact of known vulnerabilities on
layered solutions. The project analyzed past
known vulnerabilities across multiple mecha-
nisms in a layered solution. Given known vul-
nerabilities, as well as patch times generated by
statistical models, the project simulated the per-
formance of a layered security solution. The
study also explored if any of the vulnerabilities
in the individual mechanisms permitted a breach
in the security to persist beyond the application
of a patch, thus allowing an attacker to bypass
the layered solution even when the vulnerability
windows for the layers do not align. The team
produced software that, given one or more layers
composing a layered solution, identifies windows
of opportunity where an attacker could breach
any layer as well as the complete layered solu-
tion. The sponsoring government organization
is currently using this tool.
4 Outcomes and Lessons
Learned
From fall 2012 through fall 2016, the INSuRE
class produced 140 project reports on 110 sep-
arate problems, and taught 356 students (many
of whom have been hired by government organi-
zations).
In addition to the works presented at INSuRE-
Con, INSuRE projects resulted in refereed con-
ference publications (e.g., [1,2,4,9,10,14]), refer-
eed posters (e.g., [12,13]), and published datasets
(e.g., [6]).
In this section we discuss some of the take-
aways (outcomes, benefits, lessons learned, and
open challenges) from the INSuRE experience,
organized from the separate perspectives of ed-
ucators and government policy makers.
4.1 Takeaways for Educators
We summarize some of the outcomes, lessons
learned, and challenges from the perspective of
educators.
Outcomes. To improve the course, faculty fre-
quently discussed process and outcomes. In May
2014, students were asked to submit course feed-
back via an online survey administered through
SurveyMonkey. Items included rank-order, Lik-
ert scale, and open-ended questions. Students
rated the course high on a variety of indicators.
The most highly rated elements included devel-
oping expertise in a specific topic in cybersecu-
rity, developing qualifications for a job in cyber-
security, and working with a mentor from gov-
ernment or industry. Students identified devel-
opment of research skills in cybersecurity as an
important course outcome. Results of the sur-
vey also showed that students found limitations
with the electronic communication methods used
to interact with other institutions.
In fall 2016, Purdue University conducted a pi-
lot study investigating the effect of the INSuRE
course on student research self-efficacy. Research
self-efficacy [3] is a self judgement of one’s ability
to perform particular research tasks. The study
included 17 students (5 undergraduate, 12 grad-
uate) from eight universities that responded to
pre- and post-surveys. Each student measured
research self-efficacy using a 100-point Likert
scale (0 denotes complete uncertainty; 100 de-
notes complete certainty).
Given the small sample size and rel-
ative nature of Likert scores, the team
analyzed the data using a nonparametric
Wilcoxon Test. Results show that stu-
dent research self-efficacy improved: pre-test
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mean 73.56, median 76.33, interquartile range
[65.38–83.54]; post-test mean 83.27, median
86.83, interquartile range [74.54–89.42]. These
gains were statistically significant (z = −2.58,
p < 0.01). Cronbach Alpha for each survey was
0.96.
Students gained valuable experiences carrying
out research, presenting their work, writing pro-
posals and reports, using tools (including for
software analysis), working in groups, building
relationships, and communicating succinctly and
effectively with their TD. Because the problems
touched a broad range of issues, students and
faculty gained knowledge outside of their focused
areas of expertise. In addition, the course in-
spired students to tackle challenging problems.
For some, it was their first exposure to research.
The project-based course helped students learn
the need to take the initiative and lead.
Several INSuRE students continued their
studies at the PhD level, citing their IN-
SuRE course as an important motivating factor.
One university reports that its INSuRE course
prompted a faculty member to include one of the
INSuRE problems to his research area. This uni-
versity also reports that the INSuRE course in-
creased the number of students completing cap-
stone engineering projects in cybersecurity and
motivated more local companies to engage in cy-
bersecurity projects with the university.
The INSuRE course has benefited from a sig-
nificant number of female students.
Although the INSuRE research experience in-
spired most students, a few learned that cy-
bersecurity research is not a path they wish to
pursue—a useful discovery for the students.
Lessons Learned. Many factors contributed to
the success of groups. To begin, it was helpful to
screen students (especially the undergraduates)
to make sure they are motivated and ready to
engage in research. It was helpful for each team
to have a student leader with strong organiza-
tional skills. TDs also contributed significantly
through their enthusiasm, availability, and prob-
ing questions.
Course alumni and alumnae also contributed
to project success. Some of them enthusiastically
functioned as course assistants, facilitators, and
mentors.
In some terms, instructors required each group
to provide periodic peer evaluations of a paired
group. Doing so provides additional feedback to
the evaluated group, and it helps the evaluating
group learn the research process. While there
can be significant value, such peer evaluations
come at a cost of time and effort for students
and faculty, and it can be difficult to coordinate
across diverse university schedules.
Some schools restricted enrollment to gradu-
ate students; others permitted some undergrad-
uates to participate. In mixed classes, more
advanced (e.g., PhD) students were usually ex-
pected to carry out greater leadership roles than
were undergraduates. Many of the instructors
found, however, that student performance typi-
cally had more to do with student capability and
motivation than with degree level.
While most schools offered the INSuRE expe-
rience as a dedicated course, others enrolled stu-
dents as independent study projects or as part
of an existing capstone course.
The faculty found the biannual in-person
meetings very useful, helping participating uni-
versities to improve the course by applying
lessons learned. They also fostered stronger per-
sonal relationships necessary for effective collab-
oration.
Challenges. Challenges included dealing with
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different time zones and university schedules
(e.g., semester vs. quarter systems). Also, while
useful, the conferencing software yielded video
displays that were limited in comparison to the
rich interaction possible through in-person meet-
ings. It requires a significant involvement by the
instructor to stay on top of all projects.
One semester is a short period of time to com-
plete a research project, yet one year might be
longer than many students are willing to invest.
At many of the universities, grant support was
essential to enable a faculty member to be al-
lowed to teach a small specialized research course
counting toward his or her official teaching du-
ties. Teaching the INSuRE class often meant not
teaching some other course, which might have
been a larger required class.
Some centralized support was essential, to or-
ganize the network, to maintain a repository of
project work, and to manage the collaborative
technologies. Financial resources are needed for
this centralized support, for hardware and soft-
ware, for the in-person meetings, for support by
a teaching assistant if the class is large, and for
instructor time.
4.2 Takeaways for Government Policy
Makers
At modest investments, the INSuRE Project
produced a sizable return, especially in terms
of recruiting highly-qualified cybersecurity stu-
dents into the government workforce. Be-
yond resumes, student experiences with INSuRE
demonstrate the ability of students to under-
stand technology, communicate, and work effec-
tively in teams. In addition, by funding a re-
search network, government can support cyber-
security research without favoritism to particular
universities.
The INSuRE course enabled government orga-
nizations to stimulate research on projects that
they lacked time to pursue.
Aspects of the INSuRE model can be applied
to other settings. Inspired in part by the IN-
SuRE Project, UMBC is pioneering a new initia-
tive in which UMBC extends SFS awards to stu-
dents at nearby Montgomery College and Prince
George’s Community College, who will complete
their degrees at UMBC. While in community
college, the scholars will work collaboratively to
help solve IT security problems for their county
government.
Securing a sustainable funding model is a chal-
lenge. One option is a subscription model in
which companies and organizations contribute
in return for access to students and their work
on problems. Another model is a charity model
in which sponsors (e.g., government) fund the
program for the national good. INSuRE wel-
comes the opportunity to explore future relation-
ships with government, industry, foundations,
and other groups to continue the outstanding
student work nurtured by INSuRE.
5 The Future
The INSuRE Project has inspired and educated
students in cybersecurity, empowered them to
think freely, and engaged them in research prob-
lems related to national security. It has also
strengthened the CAE-R network and helped
government organizations, including by motivat-
ing students to pursue government service. The
course is being offered again in spring 2017. IN-
SuRE’s continued success will depend on strong
external support from government, industry and
foundations, and internal support from universi-
ties.
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